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Abstract 
In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley’s (2013) response to our 
earlier paper (Thompson et al., 2013, this issue).  In that paper, we reported difficulty in 
replicating Alter et al.’s (2007) main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by 
making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks.  Alter et 
al. (2013) argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we 
reject.  We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were not too difficult for our populations 
(such that no amount of “metacognitive unease” would promote correct responding) and point 
out that in many cases performance on our tasks was well above chance or on a par with Alter et 
al.’s (2007) participants.  Finally, we reiterate our claim that the distinction between answer 
fluency (the ease with which an answer comes to mind) and perceptual fluency (the ease with 
which a problem can be read) is genuine, and argue that Thompson et al. (2013) provided 
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The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency in the monitoring and control of reasoning:  
Reply to Alter, Oppenheimer, & Epley (2013) 
Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007) hypothesized that the use of intuitive (Type 
1) or analytic (Type 2) reasoning processes could be influenced by a feeling of perceptual 
disfluency. For example, rendering material difficult to read or asking participants to furrow their 
brows could create metacognitive unease that would reduce Type 1 and increase Type 2 
processing, thereby explaining their finding that accuracy on various reasoning tasks improved 
under conditions experienced as perceptually disfluent. These intriguing results motivated our 
follow-up studies, pursued in three independent labs, but with the same goal: to replicate the 
results and extend them in theoretically relevant ways.  We found, however, that we were unable 
to do this in a straightforward manner.  Instead, evidence that perceptual disfluency increased 
correct responding was elusive, with perceptual disfluency enhancing reasoning accuracy only 
for those of high cognitive ability (Thompson et al., 2013, this issue).  In their comment, Alter et 
al. (2013) argue that we have misunderstood basic methodological and theoretical concepts, and 
this explains our discrepant findings. Below we address their main points. 
What is the meaning of accuracy on reasoning tasks? 
Alter et al. (2013) argue that we have mistaken the meaning of accuracy, in particular, by 
assuming that accuracy (along with confidence) measures deeper processing.  We make no such 
claim but emphasized that accuracy is a poor indicator of Type 2 thinking for many reasons, such 
as when Type 1 processes produce correct responses (Thompson, 2011; Thompson, Prowse 
Turner, & Pennycook, 2011; Thompson et al., 2013, this issue).  This is why our study included 
two different measures of Type 2 thinking: response time and the probability of changing 
answers.  Nowhere did we claim that confidence is a measure of deeper processing. 
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What is the effect of perceptual disfluency on metacognitive monitoring? 
Alter et al. (2013) claim that, in their 2007 paper, they demonstrated that participants 
were less confident and more thoughtful about responses when experiencing disfluency.  In 
support of their claim, different groups of participants than those in the main study were asked 
how confident they were, either while performing a non-reasoning task under disfluent 
processing conditions, or on the target task, but under instructions not to actually solve the 
problems.  They found that participants anticipated lower confidence in the disfluent than the 
fluent conditions.  In contrast, when we measured reasoners’ metacognitive judgments directly, 
we observed that they were not reduced in disfluent conditions.  Specifically, feeling of rightness 
judgments about intuitive responses were similar in perceptually fluent and disfluent conditions 
(Experiments 1a and 1b), as was confidence in final answers (Experiments 3a and 3b).  Thus, the 
role of perceptual disfluency in metacognitive monitoring remains ambiguous. 
What is the effect of perceptual disfluency on analytic engagement? 
Thompson et al. (2013, this issue) included two direct measures of analytic engagement: 
response time and answer changes.  Although we did not find increased accuracy, in three out of 
four experiments where response time was measured, reasoners took longer to think about 
disfluent stimuli.  Importantly, this reflected longer thinking rather than longer reading time.  
That is, when asked to make quick, intuitive responses (Experiments 1a and 1b), no response 
time differences arose between fluency conditions.  Moreover, the perceptual fluency effect on 
response times remained after factoring out reading times (Experiments 2a and 2b).  However, 
additional thinking time did not lead to more answer changes or more correct answers, except (in 
the latter case) for the more cognitively able.  As Alter et al. studied undergraduates at elite 
universities, we proposed that the effect of perceptual disfluency on accuracy depends on 
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cognitive ability.   
Our results place important boundary conditions on Alter et al.’s (2007) findings:  
Researchers searching for more accurate reasoning under disfluent conditions are unlikely to find 
this with Alter et al.’s tasks, unless testing high ability participants.  On the other hand, our data 
do indicate that perceptual disfluency can trigger analytic thinking when measured by response 
times.  Nonetheless, the perceptual disfluency effect is subtle, given that additional time did not 
result in answer changes for most participants, nor was it measurable in terms of feeling of 
rightness or retrospective confidence.  We speculated that perceptual fluency may produce a 
global sense of unease that was strong enough to trigger additional thinking, but which may have 
prompted most reasoners to justify or rationalise initial answers rather than change them 
(Stanovich, 2009). 
Explaining the discrepancy between Alter et al. (2007) and Thompson et al. (2013, this issue). 
Alter et al. (2013) suggest that the items we used were too difficult for our participants, 
who were consequently unable to solve the tasks regardless of the time they devoted to them. 
Several of our tasks were modelled closely on Alter et al.’s, such as the CRT (Experiments 2c, 3a 
and 3b) and the syllogisms task (Experiments 2a and 2b). Alter et al. (2013), however, argue that 
these tasks may be appropriate for Harvard and Princeton undergraduates, but were beyond the 
ken of less intellectually elite participants.  While we agree that cognitive ability is an important 
boundary condition on the fluency effect, we disagree that our tasks were too difficult for our 
participants: 
 1.  In Experiment 3a, we tested a sample from a prestigious university whose average 
CRT score (2/3 correct) was on par with Alter et al.’s (2007; Experiment 1) sample.  These 
reasoners were clearly up to the challenge, yet we observed a perceptual disfluency effect only 
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for those at the higher end of the SAT scale.  Thus, contrary to their assertion, high baseline 
performance levels are insufficient for perceptual disfluency to manifest itself on accuracy.  
 2.  Alter et al. argued that performance on our conditional syllogisms task, used in 
Experiment 1a, was about at chance levels and well below that observed by Alter et al. (2007) in 
their Experiment 4.  This comparison conflates two quite different tasks:  conditional syllogisms 
(see below) and the quantified syllogisms used by Alter et al.  The appropriate comparison is to 
our Experiments 2a and 2b, where we used quantified syllogisms that were similar to those used 
by Alter et al. (2007, Experiment 4).  Performance on these tasks was well above chance (61% 
and 71% respectively), meaning that the tasks were not, in fact, too difficult for our participants. 
 3.  Finally, we argue that the low accuracy for our conditional syllogisms and remaining 
CRT experiments does not necessarily imply that these tasks were too difficult for our 
participants to solve.  The conditional syllogism task that we used pits elementary logic (if p, 
then q; p, therefore q?) against belief, and the CRT pits elementary math against fluent pattern 
recognition.  The computational skills and knowledge required to solve these tasks is not beyond 
the reach of most ordinary college students, e.g. performance on non-misleading versions of the 
conditional syllogism task are normally above chance (e.g., Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 
2003; Thompson, 1995).  The challenge posed by our conditional syllogism task and the CRT is 
in recognizing that the initial, intuitive, response is incorrect.  Our data suggest the experience of 
perceptual disfluency aids that recognition only for those of high cognitive ability, perhaps 
because these participants can inhibit the compelling initial response in favour of another. 
Further research is needed to identify whether this effect is determined by IQ or a correlate of IQ. 
How many kinds of fluency are there? 
We finally consider our evidence that at least two distinct kinds of fluency experiences 
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can have different effects on reasoning.  One we labelled answer fluency and the other 
perceptual fluency.  Answer fluency involves the production of the answer itself, in particular, 
how easily it comes to mind.  Perceptual fluency concerns the ease with which an entire problem 
is experienced, as for example, when the font is difficult or participants are encouraged to frown.  
We argue that the mechanisms producing these two fluency effects are distinct: one arising from 
the processes used to derive an answer, the other arising from factors external to the problem 
solving process.  On this basis, we predicted that they would have independent and additive 
effects on metacognitive judgments and reasoning performance.   
In contrast, Alter et al. (2013) argued that perceptual fluency is one of the inputs that can 
influence answer fluency.  We disagree fundamentally.  The fluency with which answers are 
produced may be influenced by numerous variables, often labelled as Type 1 processes (e.g., 
believability, emotionality, availability, habit and relevance), as well as by variables that increase 
processing speed (e.g., priming, familiarity and expertise).  These variables operate regardless of 
whether the problem is easy or difficult to read.  Moreover, in their absence, printing a problem 
in a fluent font will not bring an answer more quickly to mind.  Our data are consistent with this 
conceptualization. First, when we measured the speed of initial response production 
(Experiments 1a and 1b) it was the same in the perceptually fluent and disfluent conditions. It 
was only during the rethinking phase (Experiment 1b) that a difference in response time arose.  
Second, whereas we observed reliable effects of answer fluency on feeling of rightness 
judgments, a parallel effect for perceptual fluency was not observed.  Moreover, the effects of 
answer fluency on feeling of rightness and Type 2 thinking were the same, regardless of whether 
the stimuli were perceptually fluent or not.  Collectively, these data are inconsistent with the 
assertion that perceptual fluency is one of the inputs to answer fluency and instead support our 
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hypothesis that they are qualitatively different kinds of fluency effects. 
To summarize, building on the Alter et al. findings, we propose a model that advanced 
the understanding of monitoring and control processes in reasoning and offered an elaborated 
framework for studying metacognitive processes in reasoning.  We believe that one of the 
fundamental contributions of our paper is in pointing out that fluency effects are diverse, both 
theoretically and in terms of how they influence reasoning processes. 
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